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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce stands out among its peers of national
advocacy organizations for its efforts to influence the U.S. Supreme
Court.1 The Chamber wields its influence by filing amicus curiae, or
“friend of the court,” briefs as a secondary source to aid the Court in its
decision-making.2 Amicus briefs serve as valuable sources of knowledge
and provide the Justices with unique insights from various interest groups.
However, the role of the amicus brief continues to evolve as the increasing
number of amicus briefs filed with the Court make it impractical for the
Justices to thoroughly read all such briefs that are filed. Consequently,
those interest groups that have access to the legal and financial resources
to petition the Court, both frequently and effectively, increase their

*I express deepfelt appreciation for the guidance and research on this topic from Professor Michael
E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. John Shiffman, Chamber of Commerce Forms its Own Elite Law Team, Rueters: #Special
Reports (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-scotus-firms-chamber/chamber-of-commerceforms-its-own-elite-law-team-idUSKBN0JM10Q20141208.
2. Adam Feldman, The Most Effective Friends of the Court, Empirical SCOTUS (May 11, 2016),
https://empiricalscotus.com/2016/05/11/the-most-effective-friends-of-the-court/.
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likelihood of influencing the Justices’ decisions. 3 Most notably, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”) increased its participation in the
judicial process by filing amicus briefs at the U.S. Supreme Court
(“Court”) level with the assistance of sophisticated outside counsel, and
the Chamber’s efforts have produced positive results, with the Court
ruling in favor of corporate interests.4
Over the past 227 years, the Court has changed very little, but the role
played by amicus curiae briefs in the Court’s decision-making process
continues to drastically evolve. 5 The term “amicus curiae,” formerly
portrayed a professional relationship to the Court, in which the lawyer
was a “friend,” of sorts, assisting the Court in understanding the issue
before it, rather than acting with the influence and standing of a lawyer
representing a party.6 It was not until the twentieth century that it became
common for organizational sponsors to fulfill the role of amicus.7 Amicus
briefs provide Justices with information and perspective to assist them in
complex decision-making.8 As observed by Justice Black, “[m]ost case
before [the] Court involve matters that affect far more people than the
immediate record parties.”9
This Comment studies the jurisprudential history and influence of
amicus curiae briefs filed by the Chamber with the Court. Part II traces
the number of amicus briefs filed by the Chamber through the decades
and the corresponding rulings by the Court on related free-enterprise and
corporate issues. This Comment will analyze how often the Court has
cited the Chamber’s amicus briefs, and the perceived impact the briefs
filed by the Chamber have on the Justices’ opinions. Part III discusses the
prominent business interests promoted by the Chamber and the influence
such amicus briefs have on the Court in determining whether to grant
certiorari, and if so, what interests are at the forefront of the Justices’ and
in turn, the nation’s concerns. Part III also normatively comments on the
extent to which the Chamber’s amicus activity influences the Court, and
raises the question as to whether the Court’s pro-business orientation is
driving the Chamber’s amicus activity or vice versa.

3. Id.
4. Zachary Roth, How the Chamber of Commerce Conquered the Supreme Court, MSNBC (May
2, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-the-chamber-commerce-conquered-the-sup.
5. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 746 (2000).
6. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1901, 1910 (2017).
7. Id.
8. Amicus
Briefs
in
the
Supreme
Court,
MAYER
BROWN,
https://www.mayerbrown.com/amicus-briefs-in-the-supreme-court/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
9. Id.
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BACKGROUND
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, outside groups filed
amicus curiae briefs with the Court in as few as 10% of cases.10 Yet, by
the end of the century, outside groups filed amicus briefs in nearly 85%
of cases.11 Today, in the twenty-first century, outside groups file nearly
one thousand amicus briefs each year, averaging close to fourteen cases,
per diem.12 This significant increase raises the question as to the perceived
influence of such friend of the court briefs on the U.S. Supreme Court.
While almost anyone can submit an unsolicited brief, most lawyers and
academics are amenable towards briefs, viewing them as helpful to the
extent that they provide courts with arguments or facts not raised by the
litigants.13 Justices sitting on the Court admit that secondary resources,
like amicus briefs, provide “useful knowledge . . . in a world community
grappling with the same difficult question.”14 Codified at Sup. Ct. R. 37.1,
an amicus brief “brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not
already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help
to the Court,” which explicitly encourages arguments and claims outside
of what the adversary system provides.15
In 1971, two months prior to his appointment as a Supreme Court
Justice, Lewis Powell, as a private attorney in Richmond, Virginia,
penned “Attack on American Free Enterprise System.”16 This private
memorandum to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has since established
the blueprint for Supreme Court litigation followed by the Chamber.17
The memorandum urged the Chamber to defend the American economic
system by specifically focusing on petitions to the Court.18 Justice Powell
viewed the Court as “the most important instrument for social, economic,
and political change,” and recommended that the Chamber enlist “a
highly competent staff of lawyers. . . , lawyers of national standing and
reputation” to not only represent the Chamber’s interests, but also to serve
10. Kearney, supra note 5, at 744.
11. Id.
12. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Reliance on Amicus Curiae
in the 2012-13 Term, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.law360.com/in-depth/articles/84695.
13. Zachary Mider, How ‘Friends’ of the Court Can Tip the Scales of Justice, Bloomberg Politics
(September 12, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-12/how-court-friends-can-tipthe-scales-of-justice-quicktake-q-a.
14. David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David S. Tatel, & Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court
and Useful Knowledge: Panel Discussion at the Supreme Court and Useful Knowledge Symposium, (Nov.
15, 2008), in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, at 299, Vol. 154, No. 3 (Sept. 2010).
15. Orr, supra note 6, at 1913-14.
16. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming
the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1505-06 (2008).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1505.
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amicus to “select [ ] the cases in which to participate, or the suits to
initiate.”19
First, this section traces the legitimization of the Chamber’s advocacy
efforts and current level of its expertise and efficacy. Factors, including
the organization of the Chamber’s litigation center, the Chamber’s key
players, as well the make-up of the Court contribute to the increased
sophistication of the Chamber’s litigation efforts as a critical amicus for
corporate partners. This section also examines the Chamber’s
participation in litigation at the Supreme Court level, in terms of the
number of amicus briefs filed on behalf of corporate partners in the most
recent October 2017 Term. Finally, this section concludes with recent
cases in which the Chamber filed amicus briefs and discusses metrics
useful to gauge the Chamber’s influence on the Court.
Legitimizing the Advocacy Efforts of the Chamber
The advocacy efforts of the Chamber are unprecedented in terms of the
dramatic increase in the number of amicus brief filings, as well as the
success of the cases in which the Chamber has participated as a “friend of
the Court.” The legitimization of these efforts trace back to the mid-1970s
and the Chamber’s success continues to trend upward as the Court reflects
a pro-business orientation in its rulings.20 In 1977, the National Chamber
Litigation Center (NCLC) formed as an affiliate of the Chamber to
advocate for businesses at every level of the U.S. judicial system and
continues to be staffed by in-house litigators, several of whom are former
U.S. Supreme Court clerks,21 including a clerk who assisted Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito during their confirmation
hearings.22 The NCLC provides legal assistance to businesses with issues
including class actions, arbitration, labor and employment, energy and
environment, securities and corporate governance, financial regulation,
free speech, preemption, government contracts, and criminal law.23 The
NCLC, which is often compared to a boutique law firm with attorneys
who rival those of elite K Street firms, is often recognized for influencing
the Roberts Court’s pro-business decisions.24 In June 1977, the NCLC
filed its first brief on the merits in the Supreme Court.25 During the
19. Id. at 1505-06. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell to Mr. Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Director
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971).
20. Roth, supra note 4.
21. Who We Are, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/who-we-are
(last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
22. Shiffman, supra note 1.
23. Who We Are, supra note 21.
24. Shiffman, supra note 1.
25. Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1506.
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October 1987 Term, the Chamber filed twelve amicus briefs in support of
business interests in nine cases. 26 Nearly twenty years later, during the
October 2005 and 2006 Terms, the Chamber served as either amicus or
party in fifteen cases before the Court.27
In 2010, Chamber CEO Thomas Donohue overhauled the NCLC’s
legal team and replaced leadership with former Bush Administration
appointees.28 Donohue hired Lily Fu Claffee, a senior Bush official and
former hiring partner at Mayer Brown as the Executive Vice President of
the NCLC, as well as four Harvard Law graduates to serve in executive
roles.29 As a result, the Chamber has become a more active body before
the U.S. judicial system, namely in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.30
The Chamber continues to hire outside counsel to assist with brief writing,
and annually increases its filings nationwide to advance pro-business
decisions by the Court, as well as with the lower courts. 31 As a matter of
policy, however, the Chamber does not participate in those cases in which
businesses are pitted against each other as adversaries in the judicial
system, such as patent and anti-trust cases before the Court.32
From January 2006 to 2009, with the elevation of Justice Samuel
Alito, the Court decided forty-three cases in which the Chamber filed a
brief as either a party or as amicus. Of those cases, the party supported by
the Chamber prevailed in thirty cases, or a success rate of nearly 70%.33
Moreover, twelve of the Chamber’s thirty victories during this period
were unanimous; and in eight more victories, the Chamber, or the party it
supported, garnered either seven or eight votes from sitting Justices.34 In
contrast, during the last eleven years of the Rehnquist Court (1994-2005),
the Chamber’s success rate was 62% (forty-seven wins out of seventy-six
cases).35
From a qualitative standpoint, briefs filed by the Chamber are viewed
not only as successful, but also influential on the Court. A partner at
Sidley Austin and prominent member of the Supreme Court bar
commented that, “[t]he briefs filed by the Chamber . . . are uniformly
excellent. . . . [e]xcept for the Solicitor General representing the United
States, no single entity has more influence on what cases the Supreme
26. Id. at 1507-08.
27. Id.
28. Shiffman, supra note 1.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of
Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1019, 1023-24 (2009).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1019-20.
35. Id. at 1024.
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Court decides and how it decides them than the National Chamber
Litigation Center.”36 While this conclusion about the influence of the
Chamber is subjective, other objective efforts to assess the efficacy of
amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court are less definitive. 37 Some
interest groups file amicus briefs without much concern about which side
will prevail, but rather demonstrate to their members that they are
“bulldogs” staying on the forefront of issues important to their respective
members.38 However, the Chamber, as the nation’s preeminent businessoriented lobbying group, is vested in presenting to their members not only
that it is an active participant in litigation, but more so that it prevails as
an effective advocate for its corporate members.39
The art of filing amicus briefs is not a one-man-show. The Chamber
does not always or even usually file amicus briefs independently. Rather,
the Chamber files briefs in tandem with one or more other interest groups
or associations to promote business interests.40 Evidence41 has been found
that amicus briefs filed jointly are more likely to be accepted and
discussed by the Court.42 In the 2017 case of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court, both the Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Solicitor
General filed amicus briefs in support of defendant pharmaceutical
company, Bristol-Myers Squibb.43 The Court found for Bristol-Myers
Squibb, holding that there was no personal jurisdiction to entertain
nonresidents’ claims. The Chamber filed its amicus brief jointly with the
California Chamber of Commerce, the American Tort Reform
Association, and the Civil Justice Association of California.44 This recent
case demonstrates how solidarity among related interest groups can
influence the Court through effective and consistent petitioning.
The Chamber files amicus briefs at all levels of the U.S. court system,
from state and federal court, to the U.S. Supreme Court to promote probusiness and/or deregulatory actions.45 While this Comment focuses on
36. Id. at 1025-26.
37. Id. at 1026.
38. Id. at 1026-27.
39. Id.
40. U.S.
Supreme
Court
Amicus,
U.S.
Chamber
Litigation
Center,
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/bristol-myers-squibb-co-v-superior-court-0.
41. See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Empirical Assessment, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 69-72 (2006).
42. Michael E. Solimine, Article: State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of
Federalism Doctrine, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 355, 366 (Winter 2012).
43. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center,
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/bristol-myers-squibb-co-v-superior-court-0 (last visited Sept.
23, 2017).; 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
44. Id.
45. U.S.
Chamber
Litigation
Center,
U.S.
Chamber
of
Commerce,
https://www.uschamber.com/us-chamber-litigation-center (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
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the Chamber’s amicus briefs filed at the Supreme Court level, it would be
remiss to not mention the Chamber is an active filer at both the lower
federal and state court levels, as well.46 For instance, the Tenth Circuit
recently dismissed an appeal of final judgment against the Bureau of Land
Management’s hydraulic fracturing rule for being “prudentially unripe”
in light of the Trump administration’s intention to repeal the rule.47
Despite the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, the Chamber filed an amicus brief to
enjoin the Bureau’s regulations in the case.48
For the past ten years, not only have scholars and Court observers noted
the Chamber’s increasing involvement with cases, but also its increased
willingness to voice its’ members interests.49 As suggested by a blogger
who comments on the Court, the Chamber’s high level of activity and
success at the certiorari stage reflect its efforts to shape the Roberts
Court’s dwindling docket.50 As suggested by one political blogger, the
most active amici are generally pro-business and anti-regulatory groups,
such as the Chamber. 51 This trend is likely a product of these groups’
enhanced financial ability to afford certiorari stage briefs, as a corollary
to the liberal, left-leaning interest groups that tend to file far fewer
briefs.52 The rising tide of judicial deference to amici has inevitably led
to the Court’s new “open door” policy to “friends of the court.”53
Scholars and legal academics attempt to explain judicial decisions in
terms of legal doctrine or ideological preferences. However, other
scholars suggest that the Justices, particularly those sitting on the Roberts
Court, are driven by attitudes about the law that are not necessarily rooted
in doctrinal understandings of the law.54 The seemingly pro-business
attitude that characterizes the Roberts Court has been suggested to not
merely reflect a free enterprise bias, but rather highlights an overriding
“skepticism about litigation as a mode of regulation.”55 As one scholar
opines in his article, “businesses seem to fare especially well when they
46. U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, supra note 32.
47. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in
Support of Appellees and Affirmance, State of Wyoming v. Zinke, U.S. Department of the Interior, Np.
16-8068 (10th Cir. 2017); State of Wyoming v. Zinke, U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Chamber of
Litigation Center, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/state-wyoming-v-jewell-us-departmentinterior (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
48. Id.
49. Adam Chandler, Cert.-stage Amicus Briefs: Who Files Them and to What Effect?, SCOTUS
Blog (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/cert-stage-amicus-briefs-who-files-them-and-towhat-effect-2/.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Kearney, supra note 5, at 762-63.
54. Franklin, supra note 32, at 1056.
55. Id. at 1021.
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are defendants; even better when the justices appear to view the litigation
in question as having broader regulatory goals as opposed to individual
remedial objectives; and better still when the justices view the litigation
as lawyer-driven rather than party-driven.”56 The conservative
characterization of the Court’s recent judgments is merely an observation.
However, this presumption is not unfounded as evidenced by the Court’s
continued rulings in favor of deregulation and pro-business interests.57
The Current State of the Pro-Business Roberts Court
Political science and legal scholars agree that while the current Justices
sitting on the Supreme Court are clearly divided on most issues, the
Roberts Court largely supports corporate interests irrespective of the
Justices’ political affiliations.58 While on one hand the Chamber is filing
amicus briefs at an unprecedented rate, the business-friendly orientation
of the Justices sitting on the bench is a contributing factor to the
Chamber’s success at its Supreme Court-level amicus filings.59 It is this
current judicial climate which is favorable to the Chamber and its
corporate partner litigants, and in turn, enables the Chamber to prevail in
Court more often than not.
The Chamber continues to besiege the Court, filing ten amicus briefs
since the beginning of the October 2017 Term.60 Of the fifteen decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court this year, and for which the Chamber
filed briefs, all but one of the decisions were favorable to the litigants
supported by the amici.61 While it is not possible to precisely gauge the
degree of influence these briefs have on the Justices and their clerks when
writing their opinions, the Justices admit that amicus briefs do, in fact,
play an influential role when difficult questions arise and when the
Justices are looking for a “non-interested” party perspective on an issue.62
However, some spectators of the Court argue that the Chamber is “no
friend of the Court.”63 Parties in opposition to the Chamber’s stance insist

56. Id.
57. Feldman, supra note 2.
58. Id. See also Roth, supra note 4.
59. Roth, supra note 4.
60. U.S. Supreme Court Amicus, U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER ,
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/what-we-do (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
61. Id.; Betsy Emmert, The Corporate Clique in the Courtroom: A Jurisprudential Study of The
Success and Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs Filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 1, 2017)
(unpublished research, University of Cincinnati) (on file with author).
62. Souter, supra note 14, at 299.
63. Alison Frankel, “U.S Chamber is not friend of the court: TCPA plaintiffs to 11th Circuit,”
Reuters: #Intel, (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-chamber/u-s-chamber-is-nofriend-of-the-court-tcpa-plaintiffs-to-11th-circuit-idUSKCN1B1237.
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that the Chamber is not a friend, but instead suggest that the relations
among parties, lawyers, and amici are impermissible.64 In 2017, two
plaintiffs’ firms made attempts to block proposed amicus briefs filed by
the Chamber on the ground that the Chamber was not a legitimate amicus.
The Court accepted an amicus brief from the Chamber in DirecTV, LLC
v. Hall, which urged the Court to grant certiorari to resolve the standard
of joint employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 65 The
plaintiff’s counsel sought to delegitimize the Chamber in court, arguing
that the Chamber was too tightly tied to the defendant. 66 In actuality, the
plaintiff’s counsel argued that the Chamber was not an impartial amicus,
but rather, a party because DirecTV is a dues-paying member of the
Chamber, and DirecTV’s lead appellate counsel had represented the
Chamber in over fifty cases, including appeals where counsel drafted
Chamber amicus briefs in support of DirecTV.67 In this case, and
countless others,68 the Chamber arguably crosses the line between “an
uninterested party” and “more than a friend” when filing amicus briefs on
behalf of its corporate partners, who also financially support the Chamber.
With the ever-increasing number of amicus briefs filed by corporate
advocacy groups, impartiality from frequent amicus filers is not a realistic
expectation in today’s judicial climate.69 In response to such pushback,
the Chamber contends that suppression of amicus filings by interest
groups could be unconstitutional as proposed rules by plaintiffs’ counsels
to ban trade associations from filing briefs would impair interest groups’
First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government.70
Despite this pushback, the Chamber continues to successfully file more
amicus briefs than almost any other national interest group at the Supreme
Court level.71
DISCUSSION
First, it is useful to look at the Chamber’s amicus success rates through

64. Id.
65. DirecTV, LLC v. Hall, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center (last visited Sept. 24, 2017),
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/directv-llc-v-hall.
66. Frankel, supra note 63.
67. Id.
68. Recent
Activity,
U.S.
CHAMBER
LITIGATION
CENTER,
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/recent-activity (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
69. Frankel, supra note 63.
70. Id.
71. Debra Cassens Weiss, US Chamber Remains Champion of Cert-Stage Amicus ‘All-Stars’,
ABA
Journal:
Supreme
Court
(April
9,
2013
at
10:59
AM
CDT)
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/us_chamber_remains_champion_of_certstage_amicus_all_stars/.
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the decades to determine during which terms the Court was more
receptive to pro-business interests than others. Second, it is critical to
identify those cases in which the Court directly cites to the amicus briefs
filed by the Chamber. Direct citations serve as another revealing indicator
of effective advocacy by the Chamber, as well as of the interests which
the Court finds most important. Third, it is necessary to understand which
business interests on which the Chamber and the Court align, and on
which interests the Court diverges from the Chamber to fully grasp the
activity and corresponding influence of the Chamber. Finally, Part III
explains what impact a business-friendly Court currently has during the
Roberts Court era, as well as normatively comments on other factors that
may influence the Court in its pending decisions.
A Linear Analysis of the Chamber’s Litigation Activity
Due to the large number of amicus briefs filed by the Chamber, not
only this year, but over the past three decades, the most comprehensive
manner to analyze the success of the Chamber’s amicus activity and the
Justices’ receptivity to these briefs is to: (1) examine the Chamber’s
activity decade by decade; (2) look to the specific -- albeit rare – instances
in which the Court cites to the Chamber’s briefs in its decision; and (3)
identify those business interests in which the Chamber commonly
prevails, as well as those interests in which the Chamber rarely succeeds
at the Supreme Court-level.
Through the Decades
Since its founding forty years ago in 1977, the NCLC has caught the
attention of the Justices by filing amicus curiae briefs to advocate for
business interests, ranging from deregulation to free speech.72
Admittedly, landmark civil rights cases relating to topics such as abortion
or the death penalty are more likely to gain public attention than corporate
interest cases entertained by the Court. Nevertheless, such pro-business
cases have lasting ramifications on the nation’s corporate landscape and
entities.73 However, since Chief Justice Roberts took the bench on
September 25, 2005, the Chamber’s role as a “friend of the Court” has
shifted from a seemingly mere acquaintance to something more akin to a

72. Who We Are, supra note 21.
73. Doug Kendall, Not So Risky Business: The Chamber of Commerce’s Quiet Success Before the
Roberts Court – An Early Report for 2012-2013, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER (May 1,
2013),
https://www.theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/The_Chamber_and_the_Roberts_CourtEarly_Report_for_2012-2013_0.pdf.
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close confidant.74
During the era of the Burger Court, from 1981 to 1986, the Chamber
prevailed in approximately 43% of the cases for which it filed amicus
briefs.75 The Court warmed up to the Chamber during the Rehnquist Court
(1994 to 2005), during which the Chamber’s interests have prevailed in
approximately 56% of the cases for which it filed amicus briefs.76
Currently, during the era of the Roberts Court, the Chamber prevails in
nearly 70% of the cases for which it files briefs.77 The Court’s receptivity
to the Chamber’s promoted interests signifies a gradual shift towards an
increasingly deregulated, pro-business jurisprudential environment. What
fuels this trend, though, is a combination of internal and external factors
that create the optimal environment for the Chamber to effectively
petition the Court.
Part of the Chamber’s success can be attributed to external factors
beyond the Chamber’s control. For instance, the balance of the Court
itself plays a significant role in the outcome of business-related cases.
Traditionally, “conservative” justices tend to vote in favor of business
interests, while “liberal” justices are more likely to vote against business
interests.78 Since Justice Alito succeeded Justice O’Connor on the bench
in January 2006, the Chamber has experienced a 70% success rate in
representing its business counterparts, compared to its less impressive
track records during the Burger and Rehnquist eras.79 Studies reveal that
of the current Justices sitting on the bench, Justice Sotomayor is least
favorable to business interests. However, she still ranks moderately
liberal on her business rulings among previous Democratic-appointed
Justices.80
During the October 2017 term, the Court granted certiorari to even
more business-dispute cases. Judicial spectators noted the inherent
paradox in the Court hearing an increasing number of business-interest
cases, even after the passing of the late Justice Scalia, who admittedly
thought such business cases were “boring.”81 However, Justice Scalia
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The data of the success rate of briefs filed by the Chamber during the Roberts Court era
reflects the Chamber’s success rate from 2006-2013.
78. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 Minn. L.Rev. 1431, 1433 (April 2013).
79. The US Chamber of Commerce Continues its Winning Ways, CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER (June 30, 2014), https://theusconstitution.org/text-history/2753/us-chambercommerce-continues-its-winning-ways.
80. Epstein, supra note 78, at 1449-52; Nick Wells, “The US Supreme Court is more friendly to
businesses than any time since World War II,” CNBC: The Big Crunch (March 1, 2017 at 3:10 p.m.),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/01/supreme-court-very-business-friendly-data-show.html.
81. Mark Chenoweth, “The Supreme Court’s NOT Top 10: October 2016 Cert Petitions The
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consistently voted in line with pro-business and open market interests,
despite his distaste for these less than exciting cases. 82 Although other
current liberal justices, including Breyer and Ginsburg, tend to vote
against business interests in 5-4 decisions, by and large, the Roberts Court
is highly pro-business, with conservative justices very supportive of
business and the liberal justices voting only moderately liberal in
comparison to previous eras.83
A phenomenon that also works to the Chamber’s advantage is that the
number of cases reviewed and heard by the Supreme Court continues to
decline.84 In the October 2017 Term, the Court heard thirty-nine cases
argued. In the Spring 2013 Term, the Court heard seventy-six cases as
compared to the typical average of 150 cases heard per term in the
1980s.85 As the Court’s docket lightens and the Court continues to grant
certiorari to business-related cases, the Chamber’s voice is only
amplified, contributing to its unprecedented success rate among its
peers.86 As evidenced by the combination of the Chamber’s increased
participation as an amicus since the founding of the NCLC, with those
external factors beyond the Chamber’s control, the Chamber’s influence
has significantly expanded since its formalization of its litigation efforts
to advance its corporate partners’ interests at the Supreme Court.
Citations by the Court
Legal scholars and researchers contend that one of the best indicators
of the effectiveness or actual influence of an amicus is by tracking those
opinions in which the Court textually cites to the amicus’s brief. 87 The
data collected over the past three terms provides a snapshot of the Roberts
Court’s activity and serves as one of several metrics88 which gauge the
Justices
Should
Have
Granted,”
FORBES,
(July
25,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/07/25/the-supreme-courts-not-top-10-october-term-2016-certpetitions-the-justices-should-have-granted/#295796fa2723.
82. Id.
83. Epstein, supra note 78, at 1449.
84. Kendall, supra note 73.
85. Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted List Cases for Argument in October
Term
2017,
SUPREME
COURT
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
(Nov.
8,
2017),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/grantednotedlist/17grantednotedlist; see also Kendall, supra note 73.
86. Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May
4,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-thissupreme-court.html?hp&_r=0; Oliver Roeder, The Supreme Court’s Caseload Is On Track To Be The
Lightest
In
70
Years,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(May
17,
2016
at
9:00
a.m.),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-courts-caseload-is-on-track-to-be-the-lightest-in-70years/.
87. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends?: Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs,
20 J.L. & Politics 33, 34-35 (Winter 2004).
88. City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. (2015); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, U.S. CHAMBER

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/7

12

Emmert: The Corporate Clique in the Courtroom: a Jurisprudential Study of

2018]

CORPORATE CLIQUE IN THE COURTROOM

239

impact and influence of the Chamber on the Court as an amicus. On one
hand, the sheer number of amicus briefs filed by the Chamber illustrates
its support of its corporate members on the judicial level. On the other
hand, the Court’s rulings demonstrate its position on the interests
represented in the cases that are granted certiorari. Although it easier to
quantify the number of “influential” amicus briefs filed by the Chamber
by identifying those cases for which the Court ruled in favor of or against
the Chamber’s purported interests, tracking those cases in which the
Justices cite to, or better yet, quote the Chamber of Commerce in the
opinion itself is a significantly more precise barometer.89
Of those cases decided on the merits during 2014-2016 Terms and for
which the Chamber filed an amicus brief, the Chamber was cited,
however, in only one case.90 A relatively recent example of such a
citation appears in the landmark political expenditures case, Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.91 In a rather rare instance, Justice
Kennedy referenced the amicus brief filed by the Chamber, when
discussing the chilling effect of political speech prohibitions on small
businesses.92 The Court cites to the Chamber’s brief in two separate
instances: first, for the proposition that most members (96%) of the
Chamber are small businesses, and second, to support the argument that
the Government did not claim that political expenditures made by these
small businesses have corrupted the political process.93 In Citizens
United, the Court clearly was influenced by the Chamber’s amicus brief,
as evidenced by the explicit citations to the amicus brief in support of its
decision to reverse the district court’s judgment regarding the
constitutionality of the 2 U.S.C. §441b restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures.94
Again, the Chamber wielded its influence and the Court recognized the
Chamber’s position in the case of City of Los Angeles v. Patel, in which
the Court rejected warrantless, suspicionless searches of business
records.95 Given the relative rarity in which the Court cites amicus briefs
LITIGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/city-los-angeles-v-patel (last visited Oct.
16, 2017) (the Supreme Court cited the Chamber’s amicus curiae brief in the 2015 case of City of L.A. v.
Patel).
89. Id.
90. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2455 (2015).
91. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354-57 (2010) (citing the Chamber of Commerce’s
amicus brief urging the Court preserve business interests under the standard of Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
92. Id. at 354.
93. Id. at 354, 357.
94. Id. at 372.
95. City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2455 (2015); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, U.S.
CHAMBER LIITGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/city-los-angeles-v-patel (last
visited Oct. 16, 2017).
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in its opinions, the Court’s citation calls into question the correlation of
amicus filings and the “success” of the amici based on the Court’s ruling.
For instance, Justice Sotomayor relies on the Chamber’s brief filed on
behalf of Google, Inc. to explain that the exception to normal Fourth
Amendment rules for a “pervasively regulated” business is narrow.96
Although Patel is a paradigm in which the influence of the Chamber is
clearly reflected in the Court’s opinion, it is not only possible, but also
necessary to look to other indicators of the degree of influence of the
Chamber’s amicus briefs on the Court.
Business Interests of the Court and the Chamber
A third component to consider when examining the Chamber’s activity
in the Court relates to specific business interests advanced by the
Chamber in its amicus briefs. The data collected for this Comment
illustrates the sheer number of cases in which the Chamber has
participated at the merits filing stage, in addition to the business interests
that resonate most with the Chamber, and in turn, with the Court.97
The business interests advanced by the Chamber fall under a broad
array of interests, ranging from class actions, to tort reform, to arbitration,
and to bankruptcy.98 From the Chamber’s perspective, the issues of
administrative law, jurisdiction and procedure, employment, and class
actions have been of paramount importance in recent years.99 Not all or
even most of the cases for which the Chamber participates in the filing of
an amicus brief does the Court grant certiorari or decide the case on the
merits. Of the fifty-five cases reviewed and decided by the Supreme Court
since the 2014 Term, and for which the Chamber has filed an amicus brief,
the Court has ruled in favor of the Chamber in thirty-seven cases – a
success rate of 67%. This success rate is indicative of the Roberts Court’s
receptivity to business interests and proclivity to align with corporate
interests advocated by the Chamber.
Since the 2014 Term, administrative law stands as the most common
business interest among the cases on which the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari and decided the case on the merits, as reflected in Table
1. Administrative law, as a category, encompasses those cases that

96. City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2455 (2015); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, U.S.
CHAMBER LIITGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/city-los-angeles-v-patel (last
visited Oct. 21, 2017).
97. Betsy Emmert, The Corporate Clique in the Courtroom: A Jurisprudential Study of The
Success and Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs Filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 1, 2017)
(unpublished research, University of Cincinnati) (on file with author).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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involve disputes such as SEC disgorgement claims,100 violations of the
Federal Vacancies Reform Act,101 and questions of public disclosure
under the Bipartisan Campaign Act of 2002.102 Of the twenty-two cases
relating to administrative law, thirteen of those cases resulted in
“successes” for the Chamber and its corporate partners.103
Following the business interest of administrative law, the second-most
common business interest for which the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari and delivered a decision is related to benefits and
compensation.104 Within this category, both interests relating to Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and employment, and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) were
granted certiorari and decided on the merits by the Supreme Court. Of
the cases related to the benefits and compensation, EECO and
employment, and ERISA categories, the Court ruled in favor of the
corporate interests in eleven out of the twenty cases for which the
Chamber filed a brief the Court delivered a decision on the merits.
Table 1: Snapshot of Related Business Interests in Cases
Decided on the Merits and for which the Chamber of
Commerce Filed an Amicus Brief (2014-2017 Terms)
Health Care

Business Interests Represented

Title VII
Intellectual Property
Property Rights
Labor Relations & NLRB
Free Speech
FCA & Whistleblowing
Bankruptcy
Class Actions & Class Certification
EEOC & Employment
Jurisdiction & Procedure
Administrative Law
0

5

10

15

20

25

Number of Cases Decided on the Merits by the Supreme
Court from the 2014-2017 Terms

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Kokesch v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
See NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 267 (2016).
See Indep. Inst. v. FEC, 137 S. Ct. 267 (2016).
Emmert, supra note 97.
Id.
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Against

3

4

11

10

13

In Favor
13

Number of Cases Decided by the
Supreme Court: 2014-2016 Terms

Table 2: Chamber of Commerce Success by Term

2014

2015

2016

Term

Of the thirty-seven cases in which the Chamber has prevailed in
advocating for a business interest during the 2014-2016 Terms, nearly
half (seventeen) of those briefs have been jointly filed with one or more
other interest groups. Some of the Chamber’s most successful amici
include the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the
Business Roundtable, and the American Tort Reform Association.
Nevertheless, the relatively equal distribution of success between those
briefs filed separately and jointly with other business-related interest
groups does not conclusively indicate that one approach is necessarily
more influential on the Court. Perhaps filing jointly with other related
interest groups is a merely an economical, efficient, and impactful
alterative manner to petition the Court.
Moreover, the Chamber works closely with outside counsel on nearly
all its amicus briefs. Some of the nation’s most prominent firms and
lawyers serve as co-counsel with the NCLC when crafting these amicus
briefs, such as Mayer Brown LLP, Jones Day, and Consovoy McCarthy
Park PLLC. Moreover, the data reveals that during the 2014-2016 Terms,
the Chamber prevailed at an average annual rate of 70% during the 2014
to 2016 terms, consistent with its performance since Chief Justice Roberts
took the bench in 2005.105 As Table 2 demonstrates, since 2014, business
interests that the Chamber “champions” tend to triumph in Court more
often than fail when the Chamber files amicus briefs.
However, not all business interests for which the Chamber advocates

105. Kendall, supra note 73.
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appear to fare equally as well as others. Although the data collected
between the 2014 and 2016 Terms does not reflect a long-spanning trend,
business interests including health care, tax litigation, and jurisdiction and
procedure have traditionally been disfavored by the Court in recent years.
Of the seventeen cases in which the Court has ruled against the Chamber,
six of those decisions have either been 9 to 0 or 8 to 1 decisions and only
three of the decisions have been 5 to 4 decisions. Notably, the Court has
delivered adverse decisions to the Chamber’s interests in 9 to 0 in cases
relating to employment-related issues, primarily pertaining to Benefits
and Compensation.106 The issues on which the Court splits generally
relate to administrative law and government litigation, as opposed to
issues relating to health care wherein the Court has recently ruled against
the interests advanced by the Chamber.
The Impact of a “Business-Friendly” Court
The Chamber is, indeed, a “friend of the Court,” as evidenced by its
recent and continuing success in Supreme Court litigation. However, the
current and future impact of a pro-business Court is far from a model of
clarity.107 Inherent danger exists when attributing the Chamber’s success
only to the conservative tilt of the Roberts Court. The presumption that
the Court reflexively rules in favor of the Chamber is too simplistic given
the multitude of other factors that influence the Justices. First, the
politically neutral presence of the NCLC counters the argument that the
“conservative” Chamber grabs the attention of the conservative Roberts
Court. The NCLC manages to present its business positions in a facially
neutral manner, vis-à-vis its virtual presence and in its amicus filings.108
Moreover, the litigation strategies utilized by the Chamber indicate that
the NCLC is keen to participate as amicus in cases that are likely to prevail
in court, while avoiding participating in those cases that the Chamber
perceives as less likely to succeed on the merits.109 Second, various
external factors, in addition to amicus briefs filed on behalf of corporate
litigants, likely influence the Court. The salience of the Chamber’s briefs
is likely diluted by pressure from political parties, media outlets, and case
precedent. Therefore, this Comment suggests that perhaps, the “corporate
clique” between the Chamber and the Court is less a product of the
Chamber’s amicus activity, and rather a product of external dynamics.

106. Emmert, supra note 97.
107. Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts.html?pagewanted=all.
108. Who We Are, supra note 21.
109. Kearney, supra note 5 at 750.
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The Current Impact
The Court’s decisions during the past three terms cumulatively reflect
the pro-business orientation of the Roberts Court, as echoed by political
science scholars and judicial reporters alike.110 However, when
examining the data collected over this short period of time and comparing
it to the broader trends of amicus activity by the Chamber over the past
decade, the direct impact of the Chamber on the Court is less dramatic
than some scholars and reporters suggest.111 The sparse number of
citations to the Chamber’s briefs in the Court’s opinions, the politically
neutral positions taken by the NCLC, and the lack of first-hand
acknowledgement by the Justices and/or their clerks of the influence of
amicus briefs implies that the Chamber’s actual influence on the Court
cannot be clearly confirmed or denied.
The Chamber is rarely cited by the Court, in comparison to the number
of briefs filed by the Chamber in support of various business interests.112
While scholars opine on the rise of judicial activity by the Chamber and
the Roberts Court’s apparent favoritism towards corporations, these same
scholars fail to provide substantial research or commentary on the
frequency of the Court’s direct citation to Chamber briefs – a better litmus
test for the actual influence of the Chamber of the Justices.113 As
illustrated in Part A of the Discussion, the Court infrequently cites to
amicus briefs, and the Chamber’s briefs are no exception to this
phenomenon. Rather, it may be more accurate to reframe the tendency of
the Court to rule in favor of the Chamber’s business interests as a
reflection of the Justices’ broadly shared vision that litigation is not the
ideal mode of regulation.114
Another indicator of the Court’s diluted impact on the Court relates to
the NCLC’s politically neutral stance. As an affiliate of the Chamber, the
NCLC refrains from blatantly advocating for “conservative” interests in
front of the Court. The former Executive Vice-President of the NCLC
commented that the Court relies on briefs filed by the Chamber because
it is a “credible voice for business,” as opposed to being a purely political
affiliated proponent.115 Unlike the Chamber’s other affiliate, Institute for
Legal Reform (ILR), which supports civil justice reform, the NCLC
website remains politically neutral and transparent in its success rates at
110. Chandler, supra note 49; Franklin, supra note 32.
111. Liptak, supra note 86.
112. Emmert, supra note 97.
113. Kendall, supra note 73. This CAA article provides commentary on the Roberts’ Court’s probusiness orientation during the 2012-2013 terms. It does not, however, discuss cases that cite amicus
briefs filed by the Chamber as an indicator of influence on the Roberts’ Court.
114. Franklin, supra note 32, at 1054-55.
115. Liptak, supra note 107.
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every level of litigation.116 The ILR advocates for many of the same issues
as the Chamber, but unlike the Chamber, the ILR expressly claims to
“shine[] a light on what is wrong in the legal system.”117 In stark contrast,
the NCLC website refrains from political dialogue, and instead provides
readers with a database of case information for nearly every amicus brief
filed by the Chamber, with information regarding the disposition of the
case, the court from which the case was appealed, and a synopsis of the
case’s main issues. Although it is difficult to determine the Court’s
perception of the Chamber, it is possible that the Court views the Chamber
and the NCLC arm as less politically-motivated, focused primarily on
promoting free enterprise and deregulation. By simple comparison, the
NCLC appears more neutral in terms of its goals, motivations, and broad
range of business issues, as compared to the relatively more specific
issues for which the ILR zealously advocates.118
As reflected by the data collected for this study, the true impact of the
amicus briefs filed by the Chamber is subject to conjecture. Aside from
rare comments from the Justices themselves or from their clerks, it is
difficult to understand the impact of the Chamber’s amicus briefs on the
Court’s determinations.119 While the data collected for the purposes of
this Comment, and the data collected by other judicial scholars suggest
that a relationship exists between the frequency with which the Chamber
files amicus briefs at the Supreme Court level and the orientation of the
Roberts Court in ruling in favor of the Chamber’s purported interests,
correlation between the Chamber’s amicus briefs and the Court’s probusiness decisions does not imply causation, or vice versa.120
Without additional insight – such as personal testimony by the Justices
or by their clerks, or textual citation to the Chamber’s briefs in the Court’s
opinion – a truly bona fide relationship between the Chamber’s amicus
activity and the Court’s response cannot be definitively established.
Ancillary factors also must be considered which may skew the public’s
perception of the impact of the Chamber’s briefs, including the political
make-up of the Justices, as well as the shrinking docket of the Court.121
116. About
ILR,
U.S.
CHAMBER
INSTITUTE
FOR
LEGAL
REFORM,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/about-ilr (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
117. Issues,
U.S.
CHAMBER
INSTITUTE
FOR
LEGAL
REFORM,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The ILR conducts research and
advocates for issues, including class actions, False Claims Act (FCA), lawsuit lending, over-enforcement,
and third party litigation funding (TPLF). The ILR, however, targets reducing “meritless” lawsuits.
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The ILR conducts research and
advocates for issues, including class actions, False Claims Act (FCA), lawsuit lending, over-enforcement,
and third-party litigation funding (TPLF). The ILR, however, targets reducing “meritless” lawsuits.
118. Id.
119. Souter, supra note 14.
120. Epstein, supra note 78, at 1433.
121. Chandler, supra note 49.
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Legal scholars agree that it is nearly impossible to gauge the true salience
of the Justices’ pro-business orientation from the outcome of the cases
alone.122 However, it is fairly unlikely that business interests are of the
most salience or importance to the Justices, who come largely from public
sector or academic backgrounds, as opposed to in-house corporate
counsel positions or private practice.123
Table 3: The Position Supported by the Chamber in
"Successful" Cases (2014-2016 Terms)

14%
Petitioner
Respondent
32%

54%

N/a

Table 3 suggests that other factors, such as the litigant’s position as
petitioner or respondent possibly contributes to the outcome of the cases
in which the Chamber files amicus briefs. In 54% of the cases in which
the Chamber filed a brief and the Court ruled in favor of the Chamber’s
interests, the Chamber supported the petitioner. Although the data set
looks specifically at data from the past several years, it is more than likely
that the Chamber, like other interest groups, chooses to file amicus briefs
for only those cases which it believes that the litigant(s) has or have a
relatively high likelihood of winning. The recent trend in the Chamber’s
success with petitioners may not indicate a strong correlation between the
litigant’s position, but rather supports the notion that the Chamber
primarily advocates for corporate litigants with the financial means and
access to sophisticated legal aid to argue before the Supreme Court.
It is naïve to assume that the Chamber files briefs for every businessrelated case that comes before the Supreme Court. Even though the NCLC
does not hold a crystal ball to predict the outcome of every case for which
it files an amicus brief, the seasoned attorneys at the NCLC, as well as its
co-counsel, understand with which business interests and corporate
litigants the Chamber will likely have success serving as a “friend of the
Court.”124
122. Franklin, supra note 32, at 1055-56.
123. Id.
124. Liptak, supra note 107 (quoting the now-former Executive Vice-President of the NCLC in
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External Factors That Influence the Court
Ultimately, more research must be conducted to evaluate the extent to
which the Chamber’s amicus briefs impact the Court. Legal scholars and
Court observers are swift to attribute the Court’s pro-business orientation
to the Chamber’s increased amicus participation. However, this
correlation must be observed with caution for several reasons. First, the
apparent increase in the Chamber’s amicus activity is likely a product of
the overall trend in increased amicus filings by interest groups. 125 Second,
the Court is likely influenced, to an equal or greater degree, to vote in line
with business interests because of external or internal pressures beyond
that of the Chamber’s amicus briefs. Third, the current make-up of the
Court suggests that political pressure from the Justices’ appointed parties
also plays a significant role in how the Justices vote on business issues,
with Republican-affiliated Justices voting overwhelmingly in favor of
business interests.126 As a result, the true influence and success of the
Chamber’s amicus briefs must be examined with heightened caution to
avoid placing undue weight on the Chamber’s advocacy efforts.
By examining the historical activity and “success” of the Chamber in
Court, one can identify factors that may influence the Court’s probusiness orientation in recent years to forecast the future judicial climate.
Since 1981, during the era of the Burger Court, the Chamber’s success
rate at the Supreme Court level lagged behind its loss rate until the era of
the Rehnquist Court. During this period, the success level increased from
43% to 56%.127 In the early days of the Roberts Court, specifically
between 2005 and 2013, the success rate of the Chamber climbed to
nearly 69%.128 While this 13% increase in the Chamber’s success rate in
Court for its litigious “friends” may appear dramatic at first blush, it is
possible that other external factors beyond the Chamber’s presupposed
persuasive briefs played a defining role in the Court’s dispositions.
Even if the “amicus machine”129 currently trends as a popular tool
among litigants to effectively petition the Court, it is undeniable that both
internal and external factors manage to influence the Justices’ final
decisions. Such factors may include, but are not limited to, the Justices’
personal beliefs, time limitations, other branches of government, social
stating that “[t]here has been a return on investment,” in terms of the Chamber’s success in persuading
the Roberts [C]ourt to take its cases).
125. Kearney, supra note 5, at 751.
126. Nick Wells, The US Supreme Court is more friendly to businesses than any time since World
War
II,
CNBC:
The
Big
Crunch,
(March
1,
2017
at
3:10
p.m.),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/01/supreme-court-very-business-friendly-data-show.html.
127. Kendall, supra note 73.
128. Id.
129. Larsen, supra note 6, at 1906.
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values, public opinions, and judicial philosophy.130 Some legal scholars
tend to measure the effectiveness of amicus briefs in a vacuum, but rather
they must be considered in tandem with these other elements to prevent
the inflation of any single factor’s influence on the Court’s rulings.131
Thus, the recognition of the interplay of external influences on the Court
reframes and refracts the recent data relating to the Chamber’s frequent
amicus activity and the Court’s partiality toward corporate interests.
What is less clear is whether the current favorable climate for the
Chamber, as an effective “friend of the Court,” is a singular product of
the Chamber’s amicus activity, an alternate factor, or some combination
of factors that influence the Court.132 Although some studies133 suggest
that amicus participation is related to success at the certiorari and merits
stage, this correlation does not indicate causation with respect to the
Chamber’s participation and success in Supreme Court litigation. As
reflected in the data134 examined for the purposes of this Comment, as
well as by information collected to study the impact of amicus briefs, at
large, the actual effect of amicus briefs were likely less impactful than
amicus-filing interest groups would otherwise like to suggest. As
evidenced by the publication of amicus activity by the NCLC on its
website, interest groups, like the Chamber, want to communicate to their
members and to their partners that they are actively advocating for their
interests.135 These interest groups are motivated, either in part or in whole,
by self-serving interests to appear as proactive advocates for their duespaying members. By being an “active” amicus, interest groups give the
appearance of being bulldogs in the courtroom, representing and fighting
for their members’ interests. While the Chamber and other interest groups
are propelled by unselfish motivations for their members, it is critical to
the groups’ public image and persona to frequently participate in highprofile and relevant litigation.
As discussed throughout this Comment, the Justices sitting on the
Supreme Court are more likely to vote in favor of business interests than
any other Court since World War II.136 Particularly with President
Trump’s appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch, businesses are likely to
130. See Larsen, supra note 6; see also Rachel Horne, Factors that Influence Supreme Court
Decisions,
INFOGRAM,
https://infogram.com/factors-that-influence-supreme-court-decisions1gdx3pwj86qrmgr (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
131. See Feldman, supra note 2.
132. Kearney, supra note 5, at 830.
133. Franklin, supra note 32, at 1026-27.
134. See Emmert, supra note 97 (data collected by and on file with author indicates that during the
2014 to 2016 Terms, the Roberts Court ruled in favor of corporate interests when the NCLC filed amicus
briefs on behalf of the Chamber).
135. Who We Are, supra note 21.
136. Wells, supra note 126.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/7

22

Emmert: The Corporate Clique in the Courtroom: a Jurisprudential Study of

2018]

CORPORATE CLIQUE IN THE COURTROOM

249

continue to prevail over regulatory interests.137 Gorsuch falls on the
conservative end of the Court’s spectrum, resembling many of the same
ideologies of Justice Alito, who also voted in favor of corporate
interests.138 While Republican-appointed Justices are likely to vote in
favor of corporate interests, Democratic appointees now are, surprisingly,
inclined to vote in line with business interests more frequently than many
Republican appointed Justices who previously sat on the Bench.139 Also,
research indicates that over 73% of high-profile corporate cases that have
made national headlines since 2005 were decided in favor of businesses’
interests.140 As evidenced by the Roberts Court’s voting records, political
pressure, as well as pressure from the media and the public’s opinion are
significant factors that influence the Justices’ decisions. Without
additional evidence of direct linkage between the Chamber’s filed amicus
briefs and the Court’s voting pattern in favor of business interests, the
causal chain between the Chamber’s amicus activity and its influence on
the Court cannot be affirmatively established.
CONCLUSION
While the Chamber has, and continues to position itself as a “friend of
the Court,” it is possible that the reverse is true - rather, that the Roberts
Court is a “friend of the Chamber.” The Chamber is an active amicus,
filing more briefs than most interest groups, and in turn, the Court has
ruled in favor of the Chamber’s corporate interests. However, there are
numerous other factors that contribute to the Court’s decision-making
processes, in addition to its consideration of amicus briefs.
It is possible that the Roberts Court can be accurately described as a
“friend of the Chamber,” because the current Justices are likely to
embrace business-friendly judgments due to of their political affiliation,
or because of pressure from the media or public opinion. Although amicus
briefs filed by the Chamber and other pro-business interest groups may
impact the Court’s decisions, Justices and their clerks admit that amicus
briefs are often overlooked or disregarded during the voting process.141 In
light of this revelation, the Chamber’s seeming “success” may in actuality
be incidental, and not directly causal in nature.
The relationship between the Court and the Chamber can be likened to
that of a celebrity or a public figure advocating for social change. While
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing data from Preliminary Data Updating Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A.
Posner, “How Business Fairs in the Supreme Court,” 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431 (2013)).
140. Id.
141. See Kearney, supra note 5, at 745-46.
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a celebrity seeks to influence Congress or a similar administrative agency
to expand healthcare access or peacekeeping efforts, this social push is
also a means by which the celebrity can increase his or her own publicity.
It is also unlikely that the celebrity’s social push, independently
influenced or motivated Congress or an administrative agency to legislate
or implement change in a certain way.
Likewise, the Chamber, like a celebrity or public figure seeking to
influence change, uses its resources and public clout to solicit support for
its causes. While the Chamber is driven, at least in-part, by its mission
and purpose142 to promote the needs of business and industry, the
Chamber, like any interest group, seeks to outwardly appear as an active
Capitol Hill advocate for it its dues-paying members. Simply because the
Chamber is an active amicus does not necessarily imply that the Justices
or their clerks are influenced by or, for that matter, read the Chamber’s
amicus briefs.
Legal scholars and spectators obfuscate the correlation and causation
between the Chamber’s amicus briefs and the Roberts Court’s seeming
favoritism of corporate interests. The extent to which the Chamber’s
briefs influence the decisions handed down by the Court cannot be easily
or objectively measured.143
Instead, this Comment suggests that empirical studies of the Chamber’s
influence are inconclusive because they only consider the ultimate
outcome of the cases for which the NCLC files an amicus brief. Rather,
the actual influence of the Chamber on the Court must be examined from
multiple perspectives, including the political pressures from the parties
appointing the Justices to the Bench, as well as the nation’s social climate
and citations to the Chamber’s briefs in the Court’s opinions.
Nevertheless, the findings of this Comment and future empirical research
will contribute to the jurisprudential understanding of the pro-business
orientation that has come to characterize the era of the Roberts Court, and
the ostensible “corporate clique.”

142. About the U.S. Chamber, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/aboutus/about-the-us-chamber (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
143. See Feldman, supra note 2.
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